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Book Review

PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY: LEGAL
AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, by
James Charles Smith (ed)1
JASON LESLIE*
THE PRECISE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP between property and sovereignty

is an ancient and perplexing question. Modern debates on the issue often start
with Morris R. Cohen’s famous piece, “Property and Sovereignty,” in which he
argues that private property rights are in essence a form of delegated sovereignty
or public power.2 Property and Sovereignty: Legal and Cultural Perspectives
contributes to this discussion though a series of essays that explore many facets
of the intersection between these two concepts. Through a whirlwind tour of
military conflict zones, outer space, HBO dramas, nineteenth-century American
pastoral artwork, virtual reality gaming, ancient Roman political dynasties, and
other topics, the chapters in the book weave together dramatically different
examples of the connections between private wealth and public power. By
juxtaposing seemingly disparate scenarios, the book highlights the common
aspects among these various subject areas. It provides both useful examples and
food for thought for anyone interested in property and sovereignty, not only
from a legal or cultural perspective, but also from the perspectives of political
theory, sociology, history, and anthropology.
*

LLM candidate, University of British Columbia; JD, Columbia Law School.
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(Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2013) 324 pages.
(1927) 13:1 Cornell LQ 8.
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Editor James Charles Smith3 begins his introduction by describing
two contemporary meanings for the word “sovereignty.” The first, “political
sovereignty,” distinguishes sovereignty sharply from property. Here, “sovereignty”
refers to the power of a state to make laws, adjudicate disputes, and govern
generally. Exercising its sovereign power, a state can create, modify, regulate, or
destroy property rights. In this way, “political sovereignty” sets the parameters
within which property operates. The second conception, “owner sovereignty,”
understands property rights themselves as a form of sovereignty, by virtue of the
fact that the owner of property in a resource effectively has “power, limited but
real” over others who want or need access to that resource.4 From this perspective,
property rights define a bounded but powerful sphere in which the owner has
power akin to the power of a state over its subjects and territories.
The tension between these two ideas runs through the contributions in the
book. While on one level, the terms “political sovereignty” and “owner sovereignty”
are simply different meanings that coexist without direct contradiction, the two
conceptions ultimately point to separate visions of sovereignty and property that
are, in fact, inescapably in conflict. On the one hand, property and sovereignty
can be understood as fundamentally different ideas. Any similarities between the
two under this conception are understood in the nature of an analogy only, rather
than representing any deep commonality. The commonalities may be provocative
or illuminating, but property and sovereignty each rests on different theoretical
foundations. On the other hand, property and sovereignty can be understood as
being fundamentally the same, differing only in degree rather than in kind. Here,
sovereignty is property writ large, and property is sovereignty writ small. Scholars
adhering to this view would describe a continuum between the two as they shade
into each other, and would expect to find legal institutions and concepts in the
middle of the spectrum that cannot be categorized clearly as one or the other.5
The three chapters that follow the introduction explore the effects of
territorial instability on property and sovereignty. In chapter one, “Relaxing Legal
Norms to Restore Rights to Homes and Land in the Aftermath of War,” Megan
J. Ballard argues that the regular, peacetime rules regarding registration of land
ownership and evidence of title should be loosened when a population returns to
3.
4.
5.

Smith is John Byrd Martin Chair of Law at the University of Georgia.
Cohen, supra note 2 at 12.
Cf. Joseph William Singer, “Sovereignty and Property” (1991) 86:1 Nw UL Rev 1. Singer
describes how Indigenous tribes and their connection to land is interpreted by legal actors
sometimes as property, and sometimes as sovereignty, depending on which point of view is
least advantageous to the tribe in that context. Ibid at 55.
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land that has been recently restored to its members after armed conflict. Ballard
looks at the history of restitution procedures in Bosnia, Kosovo, Georgia, and
Colombia, and recommends use of a community-evidence model to help with
property title restoration. In chapter two, “Property Endowments and Social
Ordering: The Long Road to Land Law in East Timor,” Daniel Fitzpatrick
examines the complications that arise in attempting restitution in a society
that has undergone successive waves of conquest, colonization, and conflict.
Recounting the history of land reform in East Timor since independence in 2002,
he argues that indigenous East Timorese, Portuguese, and Indonesians vying for
control have skewed the land title system, creating large amounts of state-owned
property controlled by political elites and a complex, uncertain system of private
property ownership that inhibits economic growth for ordinary citizens. These
two chapters, seen together, reveal the dependency of stable property rights on
“political sovereignty” and how its breakdown can impact the distribution and
nature of property in a society.
Chapter three, “Is there a Right to Territory in International Law?,”
continues the theme of fragile statehood while turning in a new direction. In this
piece, Alexandra R. Harrington analyzes the loss of territory because of environmental changes such as rising sea levels. She traces the development of the law
regarding sovereign territory from its roots in the Roman concepts of “imperium”
and “dominium”—rough analogues of the modern notions of “sovereignty” and
“property”—through the colonial period and into the modern era. Drawing from
this history, Harrington concludes that nation states have a right to continue to
exist even if they lose most or all of their territory, although they may acquire new
territory only with the consent of the donor state.
Having canvassed issues of property and sovereignty with respect to territorial
vulnerability, the book then moves to two “new frontiers” of property law: outer
space and virtual worlds. In chapter four, “Outer Space and the Non-Appropriation
Principle,” Steven Freeland outlines and defends the international community’s
traditional view that neither space itself nor any bodies in space can be “appropriated,” either as sovereign territory or as property. (As an aside, it is interesting
to note here that although placed in different parts of the book, chapters three
and four together explore what happens at legal extremes: the former addressing
sovereignty without territory, the latter, territory without sovereignty.)
Chapter five, “Property and Sovereignty in Virtual Worlds,” examines
contemporary online, multiplayer games such as World of Warcraft and Second
Life that create new worlds, objects, and spaces. Wian Erlank argues that the
developer of the game acts as a sovereign of the virtual world, while the players
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develop interests in game objects and resources that are akin to property interests.
The sources of “law” in this virtual world include the terms of access and service
set by the developer, the software code that defines the game environment, and
customary practices that arise among players. In this virtual context, sovereignty
and property arise together to enable a new world to function. At the same time,
the new world itself is considered the property of the “developer-sovereign,” who
has an interest in limiting the formation of property rights held by the “playercitizens” as much as possible.
Part three of the book presents two chapters dealing with law and the arts. In
chapter six, “Property and Sovereignty in HBO’s Deadwood,” Michael B. Ken, Jr.
and Lance McMillan discuss how the television series explores the development
of property and sovereignty in a gold-rush era settlement near the Black Hills in
South Dakota. The fictionalized account provides an entertaining backdrop for
the long-standing “gunfight” between “natural rights” accounts and “positivist”
accounts of property rights and their relationship to sovereign government.
In chapter seven, “American Scenery and American Sovereignty: A Quantitative Analysis of Landscape and Property before the Civil War,” Anna Elizabeth
Lineberger and Alfred L. Brophy investigate two collections of landscape prints
from the mid-1800s to show how they reflect the dominant mindset of the times:
land is to be developed, and development is necessarily progress.
Part four then turns to aspects of the regulation of property, revealing how
“political sovereignty” has a direct impact on the shape of property rights. In
chapter eight, “The Rise and Fall of the ‘Underclass’: Ideology and Governmental
Exclusion of the Poor through Zoning,” David Ray Papke traces the history of
the concept of the “underclass” in American society, which rose to prominence in
the 1970s and 1980s but gradually faded to obscurity during the 1990s and early
2000s. He notes that in its heyday, the idea of an “underclass” prompted judicial
oversight of zoning regulations to ensure an adequate supply of low-income
housing.6 In chapter nine, “Governmental Marks: What Souvenirs Say About
Speech and Sovereignty,” Malla Pollack argues that no one, including governmental entities, should be entitled to trademark protection for marks that
indicate origin from or affiliation with a governmental body. In her view, the
political nature of sovereign entities should preclude the assertion of a property
right in public designations and descriptors as against private citizens. Consumer

6.

See especially Township of Mount Laurel v Southern Burlington County NAACP, 423 US 808
(1975) (known as “Mount Laurel I”); Southern Burlington County NAACP v Township of
Mount Laurel, 92 NJ 158 (1983) (known as “Mount Laurel II”).
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protection can be adequately provided for by remedies for fraud or by requirements to use disclaimers.
To this point, most of the pieces in the book have, explicitly or implicitly,
understood property and sovereignty as essentially different, though perhaps
related in some interesting ways. The final chapters suggest more fluidity between
the two concepts. The first contributor, Larissa Katz, examines the doctrine of
adverse possession. In chapter ten, “Adverse Possession and Sovereignty,” she
argues that the doctrine is best understood as a recognition of de facto over de
jure title in a manner similar to the international recognition of a new de facto
government after a political coup d’état. Katz claims that a primary concern of
property law is to ensure that all resources have a clear owner who is responsible
for setting the agenda for their use.7 The doctrine of adverse possession thus
evolved to recognize that in cases of long-standing, notorious, and adverse use,
recognizing the person in de facto control as the new owner promotes stability
and certainty. In chapter eleven, “The Semi-Sovereign Corporation,” Daniel J.H.
Greenwood explores the notion that corporations are best seen, not as property
owned by their shareholders, but as quasi-sovereign political bodies mediating
the interests of their various stakeholders. Outlining the early history of the large
colonial companies and the later development of modern corporate law in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Greenwood argues that the law should
return to the original understanding of corporations as delegates of sovereign
power and analyze them through a political, rather than an economic, lens.
Finally, in chapter twelve, “Status, Contract, Identity, and Sovereignty: What
the Romans Have to Tell Us About Family Property,” David S. Rosettenstein
outlines the role of family property under the ancient Roman plutocratic system.
His exposition shows how the Roman property concept of “dos,” somewhat
analogous to the medieval European notion of “dowry,” evolved over centuries
as part of a complex dance of sovereignty and power among the great Roman
houses. As a lesson for modern American family law, he suggests that the
regulation of financial arrangements on marriage and divorce should take into
account the interests of the extended families of both spouses and encourage a
dynastic accumulation of wealth and power.
Taken as a whole, Property and Sovereignty serves two important purposes:
it gets the reader thinking critically about the relationship between these two
fundamental but abstract concepts, and it explores legal structures that exemplify
these concepts in different ways. In relation to Cohen’s controversial claim
that property is a form of sovereignty, the work does not provide any specific
7.

Larissa Katz, “Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law” (2008) 58:3 UTLJ 275.
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theoretical treatment, but instead lays out a range of phenomena that such a
treatment would need to address, if offered. As well, the phenomena explored are
by no means exhaustive. Notably, there is very little discussion of Aboriginal title
and self-governance, and none whatsoever regarding either systems for redistribution of wealth or the impact of bankruptcy law, receiverships, and corporate
restructuring on property and sovereignty. However, given the tremendous range
of issues that could have been covered, this oversight is not surprising, and the
work does not claim to be comprehensive in this regard.
By focusing more on exposition than explanation, the book raises many
questions. For starters, several chapters point to situations where sovereignty
and property have arisen together, or could arise together, in a new form: in
outer space, in online environments, and in a gold-rush era community. What
is happening in these scenarios? Do property and sovereignty arise in some sense
independently, and then need to relate to one another? Or do they necessarily arise
together, creating a coherent and unified system? Similarly, the book examines
several situations where there is a breakdown in the sovereignty/property order,
and asks about the political and legal responses to such situations: post-conflict
repatriated zones, de-colonized countries, complete loss of territory, and de facto
displacement of a nominal owner by a squatter. In these circumstances, are we
dealing with questions of allocation of property rights, exercises of sovereignty,
or both? Are these public or private questions, or both, or neither? Finally, the
book explores a few areas where property and sovereignty appear to be effectively
inseparable: in land-use planning and zoning, in the constitutional makeup and
function of the corporate form, and in the intricacies of property and political
power dynamics in any society where dynastic wealth can accumulate. How do
the distribution of property and the definition of property rights interfere with or
confine the exercise of sovereignty in a society? Which structures do we consider
“sovereign” and which do we consider “property”? And why?
The contributors to the book sometimes provide partial answers. Indeed,
readers looking to advance their knowledge and understanding of the particular
area addressed by an individual chapter will find useful descriptive and normative
analysis on the topic. However, the most significant way in which the book adds
to the discussion on sovereignty and property is by prompting these questions in
the first place. Anyone working on further understanding this complex relationship will need to grapple with these questions, and will need to consider how the
issues raised by these questions play out in a wide variety of contexts. Although
the book may have missed an opportunity to engage in a detailed and integrated
critique, it does provide both a springboard for further investigations of the

LESLIE, PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY 653

multifaceted aspects of the connection between property and sovereignty and a
foil against which to test theoretical explorations of that connection.

